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Dear Sir,
It is my impression that Kurdish people often think of  the 
lives, mores, and lifeworlds in Europe and the Middle East 
in terms of  a dichotomy or even as complete opposites. In 
my letter, I would like to draw readers’ attention to historical 
parallels, links, and commonalities between medieval Kurdish 
worlds and those in medieval and early Modern Central 
Europe, especially in the case of  Hungary.
Strong, independent medieval histories were followed by 
500 years of  trouble and dependency in both Hungary and 
the Kurdish lands (Arpadian dynasty in the Middle Ages and 
High Middle Ages in Hungary versus Merwanids, Saladdin for 
Kurds). Glorious medieval histories for both people ended 
roughly at the same time: By 1526, the battle of  Mohacs for 
Hungary and the famous 1514 Battle of  Chaldiran for Kurds.
Following the early 16th century, both medieval nations’ core 
territories mostly fell under the Ottoman state (for Hungary 
1526–1686/1719, Kurdistan changing but 1514–1920 – until 
the Treaty of  Sevres).
Both lands developed traditions of  fighting and respect, 
especially for aristocratic traditions and virtues in both 
Kurdish lands and Hungary. Ottomans did not change 
the hereditary principle in Kurdish emirates – kingdoms 
actually (wrongly translated usually as governorates!), while 
in Hungary, much of  the old kingdom’s nobility fled to 
the North (to under the Habsburgs), some choosing the 
Ottoman side. What this means is: In Kurdish border areas, 
the Ottomans did not rely on a Sipahi system and did not link 
landholdings to service, but kept hereditary, feudal structures 
intact. Hereby, I follow a non-Marc Blochean, traditional, 
and structural understanding of  “feudalism” that posits its 
prevalence outside Europe (in places such as Japan, Northern 
Nigeria, Russia, and the Kurdish countries).
Both medieval nations have been historically placed between 
two/three major empires: Hungary between Germans (in the 
forms of  the Holy Roman Empire and then Austria)/the 
Russians/the Ottomans, Kurdistan between Ottomans and 
(Safavid/Qajar) Iran and of  course the Arabs.
Both peoples threw very numerous uprisings to ensure relative 
or absolute independence under very difficult circumstances 
for many centuries following medieval times. Following 
the Janpulat revolt (Jumblat), Ali Pasha Janpulatoglu was 
pardoned by the Padishah and became the Ottoman vali of  
(then Hungarian) Temesvar, in 1607 (executed 1610). Rozhiki 
Revolt, Bedr Khan of  Botan’s revolts followed for Kurds. 
In Hungary, the onetime local king Imre Thokoly revolted 
(his crown came from Istanbul and not from Rome), then 
Francis II Rakoczi, independent prince of  Hungary tried to 
throw off  Austria’s yoke. In Kurdistan, the Sheik Ubaidullah’s 
revolt against Sevres and the Kingdom of  Kurdistan (in 
Sulemani) followed, in Hungary: 1848–1849 put up very 
protracted anti-Austrian uprisings.
Both peoples suffered considerably under “state socialist” 
systems, especially Stalinism in the mid-to-late 20th century 
(both Hungarian leader Rakosi’s and Iraqi leader Saddam 
Hussein’s favorite teacher happened to be the selfsame 
Joseph Stalin who ran a “degenerated workers’ state”). The 
Hungarian revolution of  1956 arrived to ensure freedom 
and independence, followed by Soviet reoccupation. Iraqi 
Kurdistan suffered under the so-called “Arab socialism” of  
Saddam Hussein’s rule that brought gassing and genocide 
to Kurds in 1983. National aspirations often took on a 
conservative character against enforced modernization both 
in Hungary and in Kurdistan. Left-wing traditions are also 
present in both locales, but their success depends on whether 
they can work with land-based, traditional culture (in both 
nations, there have been problems related to this matter).
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Thus, we can see that though it may be warranted in the 
United Kingdom-key risk indicators (KRIs) comparison, 
placing a dichotomy between the histories of  Europe in 
general, or say Central Europe, and Kurdish lands, is actually a 
serious mistake. There are deep rooted, underlying structural 
similarities that unite the histories of  these peoples beyond 
mere universal, global commonalities. The case of  a Kurdish 
pasha in early modern Hungary is only the most striking 
case in this point. The strength and resilience of  land-based 
traditions, the hereditary principle for offices, and borderland 
style, tolerant versions of  religions (Islamic for Kurdish lands, 
Catholic, Calvinist, and other in Hungary) are all important 
unifying factors. Certainly, these commonalities, along with 
the KRIs, awe-inspiring resistance against Islamic State of  
Iraq and al-Sham in 2014 and beyond, have created sympathy 
in the public of  Visegrad four countries, especially Hungary, 
for Kurds and Kurdistani minorities alike.
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